Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 44, Number 3 (Fall 2006)

Article 11

Book Review: Law and Risk, by the Law
Commission of Canada (ed)
John Oberdiek

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Book Review

Citation Information
Oberdiek, John. "Book Review: Law and Risk, by the Law Commission of Canada (ed)." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 44.3 (2006) :
590-596.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol44/iss3/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

LAW AND RISK EDITED BY THE LAW COMMISSION OF
CANADA (VANCOUVER: UBC PRESS, 2005) 224 pages.'
BY JOHN OBERDIEK 2

The world is and always has been filled with risks, and many of
our laws and regulations have been enacted to contain them. The
common law of tort and the criminal law, with their accompanying
regimes of compensation and punishment, are clear examples, as they
aspire to protect individuals' most important interests from behaviour
that puts them at risk. Substantive administrative law, too, revolves
around risk, for it embodies the government's attempt to regulate the
risks posed by industrial growth or those which accompany certain social
practices. It is hardly a new idea, then, that law responds to risk. What is
new is the increasing recognition that questions of risk, and its cousin,
uncertainty, bear on an astounding array of legal issues. Paired with this
recent development is the increasing recognition that the law can be
fruitfully understood in novel ways by appealing to the concepts of risk
and uncertainty. The publication of Law and Risk, a volume of five
essays and an introduction, edited by the Law Commission of Canada, is
therefore timely.
Before offering an assessment, I will briefly summarize the
content of the five main essays. The following synopsis is intended to
provide the reader with only a taste of what the volume includes, but
enough of one to give the flavour of the book's content. Some of the
essays are quite detailed in their analyses, and most cover a great deal of
ground; I do not purport to do justice to their nuances.
David MacAlister starts off the volume with a discussion of what
he calls "actuarial justice," namely, the way in which Canadian courts
sentence criminal offenders not merely on the basis of their past crimes,
but by virtue of their projected future dangerousness through the socalled dangerous offender and long-term supervision offender
designations. Focusing on the five years subsequent to the 1997 revisions
to the Canadian Criminal Code, MacAlister notes the expansion of

'[Law andRisk].
'Assistant Professor, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden, Laurance S. Rockefeller
Visiting Fellow, University Center for Human Values, Princeton University.
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actuarial justice: the number of declared dangerous offenders has risen
substantially, and offenders who are deemed insufficiently dangerous to
merit the designation are still declared long-term supervision offenders.
These designations are based in large part on how an offender fares on a
psychopathy checklist known as the Psychopathy Check-list Revisited
(PCL-R). While noting that the PCL-R is widely considered a useful
heuristic, MacAlister concludes by observing that actuarial criminal
justice is poised to undermine a basic commitment of Canadian criminal
justice to treating individual cases individually, and not basing decisions
on "characteristics that appear to be similar to others for which
mathematical data are available."3
Shifting gears from criminal to environmental law, Dayna
Nadine Scott takes up the so-called precautionary principle in the next
essay, arguing that its adoption would enhance the democratic bona
fides of government regulation by revealing the trade-offs involved in
the analysis and management of risk. The canonical statement of the
precautionary principle, from the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development,4 holds that "where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." 5 Scott agrees with the widely held view that adoption of
the precautionary principle would effectively shift the burden of proof,
under circumstances of uncertainty, to those who create, advocate the
creation of, or benefit from a potential hazard, and would require them
to present evidence of the absence of harm from the potential hazard.
But Scott goes further, arguing that the science of risk itself must
incorporate the precautionary principle, so that, for example, false
positives are not necessarily privileged over false negatives in risk
assessment. Where the burden of proof should lie is largely a normative,
not scientific, judgment. And while the scientific status quo may hold
that, in Scott's words, it is "better that 10 toxic chemicals go unregulated

'David MacAlister, "Use of Risk Assessments by Canadian Judges in the Determination of
Dangerous and Long-Term Offender Status, 1997-2002" in Law and Risk, supra note 1, 20 at 38.
4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Report of the United.
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992 (New
York: United Nations, 1993) [Rio Declaration].
'Ibid., Principle 15.
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than 1 harmless chemical be banned,"6 science alone cannot justify that
status quo-a normative argument is needed. In Scott's own normative
view, the various values which are at stake in environmental regulation
need to be brought to the fore to guide decisions about where to place
the burden of proof.
Turning next to Megan's Law, the collective name of American
statutes governing community notification of released criminal sex
offenders, Mariana Valverde, Ron Levi, and Dawn Moore examine, as a
case study, the implications of the three-part division of labour within
Megan's Law between expert risk assessors, the legal system, and
average citizens. As the authors explain, Megan's Law works by relying,
first, on expert assessments of the likelihood of recidivism, second, on
prosecutors and judges who themselves assess and interpret the experts'
assessments of recidivism, and, finally, on the notified members of the
sex offender's community, who must make their own choices about how
to handle the risk of living with the identified offender. The expert risk
assessor, prosecutor and judge, and layperson each draw on different
"risk knowledges." By incorporating these different perspectives, and
due to the interplay between them, Megan's Law, the authors argue,
fulfills several different functions.
Danielle Pinard then delves into Canadian constitutional lawand specifically the Supreme Court of Canada's use of risk as a
conceptual tool in constitutional adjudication-and the manner in which
its risk analyses have both factual and normative components that the
Court does not always recognize.' Pinard notes and explores the tension
that arises when the Court requires laws to have an empirical basis in
order to be constitutionally valid, but then adjudicates matters on which
factual certainty is simply beyond reach. Pinard dissects the reasoning in
Gosselin v. Oudbec (Attorney General ),8 a case discussing the
government's social assistance policy for citizens under the age of thirty
and its management of moral hazard in that context. Further, Pinard
examines the Court's recent cases on child pornography, tobacco
advertising, and marijuana use. Throughout her analysis, Pinard is quick
6

Dayna Nadine Scott, "Shifting the Burden of Proof: The Precautionary Principle and Its
Potential for the "Democratization" of Risk" in Law and Risk, supra note 1, 50 at 66.
' Danielle Pinard, "Evidentiary Principles with Respect to Judicial Review of
Constitutionality: A Risk Management Perspective" in Law and Risk, supra note 1, 121.
8 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 [Gosselin].
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to point out when the Supreme Court characterizes normative
evaluations as empirical observations-slippage invited by cases in
which uncertainty reigns.
In the final essay, Duff R. Waring and Trudo Lemmens discuss
the flaws in the current regime regulating biomedical research, arguing
that it is insufficiently formalized in law and, as a result, that it exposes
research participants to undue risk. Noting that the current research
environment recognizes risks to persons and to social values, the authors
focus on the following three additional forms of risk to which any legal
framework governing such research must attend: "risk of physical or
psychological harm to participants; risks to the objectivity and scientific
integrity of research that are posed by conflicts of interest; and risk to
other social values, for example, public trust in the ethical conduct of
research."9 In exploring these under-appreciated risks which are
inherent in research, Waring and Lemmens maintain that risk
assessment is an irreducibly evaluative enterprise even if it does have a
quantitative element, and that because of this, risk assessment needs to
be more closely scrutinized with an eye on what evaluative judgments
are being made sotto voce. The authors conclude with a twelve-point
proposal for legal reform, the two most fundamental recommendations
being the adoption of federal oversight legislation, and the creation of
an independent national agency dedicated to the review of research.
One of the few recurring issues in Law and Risk is the role that
evaluation plays in risk assessment and regulation, or in circumstances
of uncertainty. Several essays emphasize the irreducibly normative
dimension of risk and chide scientists or judges who purport to be
making purely factual or empirical determinations but who, in truth, are
also or instead presupposing or indeed expressing normative judgments.
Empirical and normative claims should, of course, be distinguished and
not conflated. But let us not forget that normative claims can be
justified, and that simply because a claim is not empirical, it does not
follow that it is therefore, in some non-trivial sense, subjective. One gets
the sense in reading through the essays that many of the authors, at
least, believe themselves to be exposing as unjustified certain value
judgments simply because those judgments are presented as nonnormative. That inference, however, is too quick. The mere existence of
' Duff R. Waring & Trudo Lemmens, "Integrating Values in Risk Analysis of Biomedical
Research: The Case for Regulatory and Law Reform" in Law and Risk, supra note 1, 156 at 157.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 44, NO. 3

the fact/value gap, moreover, does not mean that empirical
determinations are irrelevant to normative judgments. Surely evaluation
is fact dependent, even if fact and value are distinct, and even if value
cannot be wholly reduced to empirical fact. For reasons of economy, let
me cite just one place where this point seems to be overlooked. In her
extended analysis of Gosselin, Pinard is skeptical of the majority's
reasoning in upholding the constitutionality of lesser social welfare
benefits for those under thirty years of age. The Court wrote that "the
complainant argues that the lesser amount harmed under-30s and
denied their essential human dignity by marginalizing them and
preventing them from participating fully in society. But again, there is
no evidence to support his claim."' 0
Much is made by Pinard, and indeed by Leiss and Hrudey in
their introductory recapitulation of Pinard's discussion, of the Court's
apparent elision of the fact/value gap here. Pinard, as well as Leiss and
Hrudey, seem to think that only normative argument has any traction in
resolving whether the complainant's human dignity was violated. But
that is an expectation that normative reasoning cannot meet, for facts
about the complainant's social marginalization certainly matter to the
normative assessment of whether the complainant's human dignity was
compromised. What seems to be dividing Pinard, Leiss, and Hrudey
from the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court, then, is that the
latter but not the former considers social science findings relevant to
determinations of constitutionality. In this way, the Gosselin Court is
similar to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, ever since its landmark 1954
desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education," has considered such
findings crucial to its jurisprudence on equality. In fact, one of the
leading affirmative action cases in the United States, the 1989 City of
Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 2 stands for the proposition that wellintentioned racial classifications are constitutional only if there are
ample and specific findings detailing a history of racial discrimination in
the relevant jurisdiction. That decision was not unanimous, but the
disagreement centred on the scope of the required findings, not on the
relevance of findings per se. Abstracting from whether the Canadian

'oSupra note 7 at 64.
SBrown v. Board ofEducationof Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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Supreme Court got it right, could not Gossein be interpreted in a
similar and more charitable light, instead of rejecting outright the
Court's requirement that a normative claim be supported by empirical
evidence?
There is a great deal to be said about each of the constituent
essays in Law and Risk, but it is simply impossible to do that in a brief
review. Let me close instead. by addressing the composition of the
volume as a whole. The essays cover a wide variety of issues; indeed,
their variety is a good indication of just how multi-faceted the
relationship is between law and risk, and of how important it is for legal
academics and practitioners to understand risk. But any collection of
essays organized around so broad a theme runs the risk, as it were, of
lacking focus. Law and Risk, unfortunately, succumbs to this hazard. As
I have noted, its essays range over the predictability of recidivism among
violent criminals, the precautionary principle's potential for enhancing
the democratic pedigree of government regulation, the respective risk
management roles accorded to experts and private individuals by child
sex offender notification laws, the interplay of normative and factual
judgments concerning risk in the Canadian Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence, and the array of risks that must be
accounted for in carrying out clinical trials. This diversity is impressive,
but there is little that unifies the essays, save for the fact that each
examines some way that risk or uncertainty has an impact on a given
legal issue. Perhaps this is all that one should expect from a collection of
essays devoted to law and risk.
So wide-ranging a collection should be tied together at least by a
common vocabulary, but even "risk" is used differently throughout.
Some authors refer to true risk, which has an evidentiary basis in
probability, while others refer to uncertainty, which admits of no such
evidentiary basis. Recidivism, for example, can be explored in light of
easily available statistics on re-offence-here we speak of risk. The
questions to which the precautionary principle provides an answer, such
as environmental degradation, on the other hand, are questions about
which no similar findings exist-these are matters of uncertainty. Leiss
and Hrudey, in their brief introduction, provide a nice account of the
language of risk and risk assessment, perhaps to prepare the reader to
translate the subsequent essays into a single vocabulary and framework;
it is a shame that translation is necessary.
All this is to say that the constituent essays share almost nothing
in common-no doctrinal focus to be sure, but also no methodology or

596
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definitions-and this, I believe, is a flaw in the volume as a whole. Law
and Risk reads more like an edition of a journal than an edited set of
thematic articles demonstrating the explanatory force of a risk-based
understanding of the law. Again, its publication is timely, but at the end
of the day, Law andRisk is too diffuse to be satisfying.

